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 The similarities are indeed striking, making it particularly worthwhile
 reading for modern naval strategists. Palmer ends his history on a note of
 sadness for "a strategy lost." Yet this is misleading. A strategy by definition
 is not something permanent. It should change as situations change and it should
 be lost when it no longer can achieve the desired goals with the means
 available. More interestingly, one might want to ask whether the Goldwater-
 Nichols Act of 1986 will not be more important than the 1953 Act in its effect
 on separate service thinking about strategy. Its fundamental thrust seems to
 be to stop independent service thinking such as Sherman's and that done in
 the 1980s. If that is the case, it would be useful to examine positive historical
 examples of the navy's cooperative effort in joint planning, showing how each
 service's roles and missions can be effectively used jointly in a national
 strategy. It would be sad for the navy, if the situation has changed, merely
 to pine away in sorrow for a bye-gone method. There is more to be learned
 from a close examination of this example.
Captain Wayne Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
 Keegan, John. The Price of Admi alty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare . New York:
Viking Penguin, 1989. 292pp. $21.95
 T companion he Price of to Admiralty his best-selling, , John Keegan The Face 's latest of Battle. endeavor, Paralleling is a his maritime earlier companion to his best-selling, T e Face of Battle. Paralleling his earlier
 book, The Price of Admiralty fulfills the promise of the subtitle, The Evolution
 of Naval Warfare , with a series of four, chapter-long vignettes that promise
 the essence of naval combat: the evolution of tactics and technology; the
 strategic setting; the personalities of the commanders; and the naval societies
 of the fighting men they lead. This talented author has vividly depicted the
 battle scenes and has included a few charts and illustrations.
 Keegan chose for his subjects, Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway, and the Battle
 of the Atlantic. The periods of action are the age of fighting sail, the age
 of the big gun, and two manifestations of sea war at this century's midpassage,
 the carrier battles and a submarine campaign. His narrative on World War
 II leads to some prognostication in the concluding chapter.
 How well does Keegan fulfill his self-appointed purpose? He does not paint
 war at sea with the bold strokes we saw in The Face of Battle. This is because
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 Keegan is basically a landlubber and not always comfortable with the language
 of the sailor. For instance, in the narration of the storm after the Battle of
 Trafalgar, three times in one paragraph we find ships that, rather than having
 run aground, "went ashore"; Jellicoe 's warships at Jutland in 1916 are called
 "ironclads."
 Keegan 's failing (I do not mean to say failure) is partly a lack of confidence,
 in contrast to his evident self-assurance when dealing with ground warfare.
 But the failing is almost a virtue. An insecure author is a cautious author.
 It is as if that trait of stolid conservatism for which navy men are universally
 condemned has infected Keegan. Doubtless because of his prestige this book
 will sell and be widely read. If so, we, the navy family, may rest easy. He
 finds a few black sheep (speaking both of men and of their ideas and ideals),
 but by and large we are a noble breed. When Keegan scratches beneath the
 veneer, which is his intent, he finds many heroes and few villains.
 And there are nice touches. Keegan has an acute sense of the importance
 of search, sighting and signalling. He also understands the first responsibility
 of a commander as one of keeping control: elegant tactics are simple tactics.
 Like Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, he cites the similarity between a warship
 and a tank: "The British . . . perceived that the means of breaking the
 stalemate [in World War I] lay in the construction of a machine which would
 combine the qualities of manoeuvre and firepower within itself. They
 characterized this conception as a 'landship' and only later, when a prototype
 had actually been built, christened it a tank." And like Fiske, he contrasts
 the firepower of a fleet with that of an army in a neat paragraph that
 concludes, "in brief, six times as many guns, of much heavier calibre, could
 be transported daily by Nelson's fleet as by Napoleon's army, at one-fifth
 of the logistic cost and at five times the speed."
 And this about Jutland: "The Grand Fleet may have appeared in the years
 between 1914 and 1916 to be the largest embodiment of naval strength, [but]
 it was a pyramid of naval power trembling on its apex." Or this about
 Midway: "At 1025 Nagumo stood poised on the brink of perhaps the greatest
 naval victory ever promised an admiral, certain to be spectacular in itself
 and destined to alter the balance of power between the Western and Asian
 world for decades to come. At 1030 he confronted not victory but disaster."
 Keegan respects the great tactical skill of the Japanese Navy in World War
 II. He also helps along a reappraisal of the quality of Japanese warships and
 aircraft, to give them their due. Regarding the Atlantic convoy sea lanes,
 the ruthlessness of the German U-boat skippers, as opposed to their devotion
 to duty, is given more weight than seems fitting from an author who
 emphasizes the violence of war, but U-boat sailors justly receive his accolades
 for courage and endurance to the bitter end. Hatred and contempt for the
 enemy are not in Keegan 's makeup.
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 This book is the result of cautious competence toward the great issues of
 naval history. The Price of Admiralty is conventional wisdom, well expressed.
 For my taste, Keegan 's portraiture of battle, like Bruce Catton's, is rounded
 out with quotes from too many letters and diaries from just plain John Does.
 It smacks of TV interviews after the disaster. But his is the equal of the stuff
 I still enjoy in Fletcher Pratt's works, Ernest Hemingway's anthology, Men
 At War, and Hanson W. Baldwin's Sea Fights and Shipwrecks .
 Former Secretary Lehman wrote a more laudatory review in the Wall Street
 Journal about a less well executed book, Barbara Tuchman's The First Salute.
 I think Mr. Lehman was kind because the thesis of Tuchman's book is that
 sea power matters and is too lightly regarded. Keegan has given lay readers
 a fair sense of sea war as at once majestic and miserable, and if I were
 reviewing for The New York Times instead of for the naval community my
 praise would be less stinting.
 Here and there Keegan strays about twenty degrees off course, and I want
 to show why that is important. He closes the book with a forecast of the
 capital ship of the future. First he gives us a limited choice between carrier
 and submarine and then casts his lot with the submarine with the belief that
 nothing on the surface will survive missile and torpedo attacks in the future.
 Hence, the title of the last chapter, "The Empty Ocean." But the title
 identifies the flaw: an empty ocean is intolerable to the United States, Japan,
 Nato and to the oil rich states of Southwest Asia. Submarines can take away
 but cannot provide. Something must protect shipping and Marines. Keegan
 writes that submarines have communications problems, but he does not say
 that communications for mutual support and concerted action are woven into
 the very essence and character of both capital ships and the escorts of ships
 which must ply their trade. A naval policy that is only twenty degrees off
 course is dangerously off course. Sooner or later its ships will have "went
 ashore," like the Exxon Valdez did last year off Alaska, or the flush deckers
 that smashed into Point Arguello in 1923. Naval policy must be better than
 that.
 Rabinovich, Abraham. The Boats of
Cherb urg. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Inst tute Press, 1988. 306pp. $18.95
T  B ats of Cherbourg is so well
wr ten that t e ea r easily
 becomes witness t  event of spe l-
inding int r ational intrigue. Trav-
eling from Cherb urg nd Europe,
 via the Mediterranean Sea to Israel
 and the Middle East, one finds a
 route replete with captivating
 accounts of the activities surround-
 ing the central issue of this book: The
 escape from France of the German-
 designed, French-built "Saar" mis-
 sile boats that became capital ships of
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